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Abstract 
Big N companies, known as the biggest audit firms in the world, worldwide dominate the audit market and their 
network organization reinforces that dominating position. Theoretically, Big N are considered by accounting 
literature as more independent than others forms of audit companies. This article focuses on that issue trough the 
analysis of the audit restatement of a big N client in Cameroon by a fully independent organism. Using four 
independence threats, the results suggest the potential vulnerability of big n local offices on wasting their 
independence when the client represents an important part of their business revenue.  
 
1. Introduction 
The issue of auditor independence mobilizes special attention from professionals and researchers in accounting. 
This importance is due to financial information crisis and financial scandals, which tend to give a general 
discrediting to the auditing profession, intended to ensure and provide quality assurance to certified financial 
statements (Piot and Kermiche, 2009). Independence is a key aspect of the audit: It is described by Schandl 
(1978) as the essence of the audit or by Wolf (1979); Whittington and Pany (1995) as the foundation and purpose 
of the audit. 
Given the need of ensuring independence, accounting literature has developed indicators that can serve as a 
reference or basis for the assessment of the level of impartiality of the auditor. Past works conclude that the large 
size auditors (the big 4 now become big n after the bankruptcy of the US giant Arthur Andersen) are more 
independent than other auditing firms (Moiser, 1997). The large number and diversity of customers (De Angelo, 
1981) of large auditors create in them a need of good reputation that makes them maintain their independence, 
and leads them to produce better quality audits (Copley, 1991 ; Clarkson and Simunic, 1994; Becker et al., 1998; 
Bauwhede et al., 2000; Zhou and Elder, 2001; Piot, 2004; David et al, 2006). This stance, though shared by 
several authors, has several weaknesses. Pigé (2003) points for example out that the size is not necessarily a 
guarantee of independence, since differences in accounting and auditing practices may exist between 
headquarters and local representatives of major audit networks. The case of the failure of Arthur Andersen is 
also a criticism of the argument size. This event showed the relativity of this argument (Manita, 2009) and, 
combined with convictions by regulatory agencies, some large networks like KPMG sanctioned in January 2014 
in the US by the SEC for «lack of independence, "reopens the question of the independence of the a priori 
acquired l for large audit firms.  
This work comes at a contribution to the debate by looking at the case of a big n Cameroon. Work on 
independence in relation to the auditor's size will be presented (1). This literature review will lead us to the 
observation of case of auditing firm KPMG in its auditor tasks of a state-owned company, the national society of 
Cameroon refinery (SONARA), and analysis of the implications of this case from the four major threats to 
independence considered by the literature as incorporated by Lin and Téplagul (2009) namely financial 
dependence, audit tenure, auditor affiliation with certified public accountant firms, and non-audit services. 
Finally, a presentation of the study results and their discussion will end this article. 
2. The size of the auditing firm, an indicator of its independence 
This part will deal with prior literature that connects auditors’ independence and auditor’s size. The idea that 
emerges and seems to create acceptance of a significant part of theorists refers to the existence of a strong 
relationship between the size of an auditor and its ability to remain independent (1). This posture can still 
following certain circumstances be called into question (2). 
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2.1 Auditor size and Auditor's Independence 
The external auditor’s size is a particular concern in auditing in that it favors, according to the findings of several 
authors, the perceived independence of the auditor. Perceived independence because all indicators are a priori 
gathered for the audit to be good. In general, larger firms have human and material resources and they develop 
very robust buddy systems to minimize agency problems (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Francis and Wilson, 
1988; Johnson and Lys, 1990; Firth and Smith, 1992 cited by Manita, 2009). Thus, a strong relationship is 
measured between the absence or low levels of problems and agency costs in some companies and the size of 
their audit firm. Major audit networks have tendance to issue more often reserves than small firms (Leennox 
1999). As a result, companies undergoing the higher agency costs have a greater tendency to engage with major 
audit networks. 
Although the use of an external auditor is a legal requirement in some environments, it is also used as a signal by 
business leaders in search of a market reaction to the publication of annual accounts. Studies conducted have 
shown for example that the market reacts more positively to the announcement end of year financial results when 
a company goes from a small auditor to a larger, that when a company goes from a great  to a smaller auditor 
(Nichols and Smith, 1983; Eichenseher et al. 1989). 
 
According to the study of Barizah Nur (2009), size is the first criterion of independence. Large firms have more 
guarantees in terms of financial sensibility, by their ability to pool in their risk of losing a client. The big audit 
networks have a large and diverse number of clients, which limits a possible financial dependence on one of 
them, which is not the case for small auditors (De Angelo, 1981). The risk of compromising the independence to 
safeguard a client that may be crucial to the auditor's survival is much higher in small firms. Investors perceive 
then audit services of the big networked auditors  as superior to isolated ones, including in terms of 
independence (De Angelo 1981 Shockley 1981 Gul and Tsui, 1992) and their reports are estimated as more 
reliable (McKinley , and Reckers Pany, 1985). 
 
Moreover, large audit networks had much more to lose in terms of reputation than local auditors, if they sacrifice 
their independence, and their name is mentioned with accounting fraud cases (De Angelo, 1981; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). Kreps (1990) estimates that confidence in the auditor is built in reference to a reputation. 
The quality of financial statements of a company audited by a big n was also considered. Becker et al. (1993) 
measured a strong relationship between the size of the auditor and the reduction of discretionary accruals of the 
company's accounts, suggesting a better result for companies audited by a networked auditor. 
This overall position of the accounting literature can also explain the rise and sovereignty that big n occupy 
today in the different auditing markets. Networked auditors have better perceived guarantees of competence and 
independence compared to out networked auditors. The international nature characterized by belonging to a large 
network, the index size in this perspective, is perceived by investors and the market as a signal of independence 
and audit quality. This position may nevertheless admit some criticism. 
 
2.2 Auditor Size and auditor’s independence: theoretical and historical controversies 
The aforementioned works seem to have omitted an important part of the auditor’s large size as mobilized, 
particularly international networked organized auditing firms. This network provision, for the overall quality and 
level of independence be generalized to the entire network, must be able to suggest a homogenization and 
standardization of certification practices within each network, that is to say from the Office headquarters to all its 
local representatives. The loss of a client for a network can for example be a small part of its overall turnover, 
but a very important part locally. In this case, if control rules for the entire network are not strictly enforced, 
there is a risk that local representation adopts behaviors that may damage its independence. According to Pigé 
(2003), network independence assumption is based on another assumption, which is that of the internal 
consistency of each auditor. If this assumption of homogeneity is not verified, the correlation assumptions 
between auditor’s size and auditor independence become meaningless (Manita, 2009).  
Historical events that occurred in the early 2000s have also questioned the positioning of the literature on the 
large audit firms, including the failure of Arthur Andersen following the Enron case. The spectacular fall of this 
international network has raised, among both practitioners and academics, many questions about audit quality 
control and supports the idea of redefining more reliable valuation rules. At times, this international network was 
ranked first worldwide network by its turnover in audit but mostly, it was the quality of his performance or 
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simply its reputation. The reputation and size of the firm have been used by many researchers to be reliable 
indicators of the quality of audit work (Manita, 2009). 
 
One can add to this historic event, all recent cases (January 2014) of KPMG in the US sanctioned by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for "lack of independence", following the provision of certain non-audit 
services regularly prohibited by the regulation. These facts combine with the incompleteness of the literature on 
the issue, which is, according to Chemangui (2004), no convincing evidence of a higher opinion of quality 
among large firms could be provided by the prior literature given the methodological and conceptual difficulties 
of such an undertaking. 
 
 This state of affairs calls back for the agenda the question of the independence of the auditor in relation to its 
size. This work will therefore try to contribute to this debate by looking at the case of a "restatement" of a big n 
client audited accounts, KPMG, by totally independent controllers. Total dependence refers here to the lack of 
financial connection (payment fees) between controllers and management, and the lack of a contract relationship 
between the two parties (the selection of independent external auditors does not depend on the direction of the 
audited company). 
 
3. Context of the study 
The observation of the phenomenon of independence is strongly linked to the context, independence is itself 
linked with audit requirements, and the existence of a chartered accountants association (ONNECCA in 
Cameroon)... The study context should be presented to describe the local audit market and its opportunity for the 
issue at hand. 
3.1 Cameroon audit market: A representation of the international market 
The audit market in Cameroon is experiencing significant expansion, with the arrival in the sector of several new 
comers offering services as diverse as those offered by the older ones. The offer is thus structured around the 
former functions of the external auditor as statutory audit or accounting expertise in our context. Alongside this 
traditional mission of the external auditor, several other services are offered, advancing the offer to the 
international modernity (Casta and Mikol, 1999). Those of them that come up most often are related to the 
accounting and management assistance, internal control, taxation or so human resources. 
Demand however has a strong tendency to focus around the statutory auditing services. In a fiscal environment 
predator like that of Cameroon (Ngantchou, 2009), the statutory audit appears to be an essential tool of 
governance. On the other hand, management advisory services seem very expensive for an economy made up 
over 90% of small and medium enterprises. 
Like international auditing market architecture, auditing in Cameroon is dominated by international networking 
companies, big n. According to the 2013 ONNECA report the big n auditors have the lion's share in the local 
audit market. The strong presence of major audit networks, coupled with the return of others like Ernst and 
Young three years ago, show the attractiveness of the sector and its dynamism. The audit of multinational 
companies and some international investment and cooperation programs consolidate that domination. The 
networked auditors enjoy therefore reputation as a major asset that can explain their leadership on the 
Cameroonian audit market. 
3.2 The Cameroonian context of «Restatement": The SONARA case 
In the various reports by Transparency International, Cameroon spurred from 2000 to 2012, the bottom of the 
ranking of corrupted countries, according to an index calculated from corruption perception indicators measured 
on a global scale up to 10 2011 and 100 in 2012. To improve this score and the fight against corruption, the 
government has undertaken a vast operation "rechecking" accounts of public institutions and administrations 
known locally under the name of "operation épervier "by external and independent auditors, under the 
responsibility and supervision of an independent body which is the budgetary and financial discipline board. It is 
in this context that the verification process occurs on SONARA accounts, audited for the period (2007-2010) by 
two co-auditors, the firm K & Co., a big n company, KPMG. The operation of "rechecking" (restatement) also 
occurs in a context where the national society of Cameroon refinery (SONARA) has a financial health lackluster 
due to soaring oil prices on the international market, and grants increasingly untenable that the state agrees to 
limit the effect of this surge at the pump price, enlisting the help of the refinery company 
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4.  Methodology and Results 
To try to answer the research question, the operation of "rechecking" accounts was considered timely. The 
literature traditionally ranks under the dome of dependence the fact that auditor receives his fees from the 
management of the audited company, which is also in charge of his selection - dismissal. 
4.1 Precautions and methodological approach 
The state controllers presented the advantage of not being dependent of the direction of SONARA for any of the 
above mentioned conditions of dependency. Their salary and their recruitment was decided by an independent 
body, the budgetary and financial discipline board itself hierarchically attached directly to the ministry in charge 
of higher state control. It is therefore possible to apply their full independence at the time of the audit. It is also 
possible to add the context of their mission (inspectors in charge of the fight against corruption), which limits a 
priori the risk of being influenced by SONARA management aware of that mission. 
The profile of the title of "controller" or state inspector as they are called locally has been reviewed to ensure, 
from consensual competence characteristics of literature (Flint, 1988; Fama and Jensen, 1983) that they had the 
necessary profile to ensure their competence. Having been trained in an elite school in Cameroon (ENAM) in 
accounting and finance techniques, as well as administrative and legal technologies seems to give them the skills 
profile required. Their management experience and the well-structured organization they belong to reinforce 
these skills. 
The texts of higher state control court governing the action of its controllers were then screened to ensure that 
significant objective differences do not exist with those of the statutory audits. To compare the results obtained 
separately, it is indeed necessary that the objectives and procedures are comparable. The insistence of higher 
state control texts on compliance with the law through any kind of accounting caution governing the operations 
was used to establish substantial similarity. Verify the reliability and fair view of the accounts being in the case 
of statutory auditors as in the case of rechecking, the objective of the mission. 
At the end of their mission, the auditors of the Budget and Finance Disciplinary Council have revealed 
anomalies in the accounts of the national refinery company for the period from 2007 to 2010, while over the 
same period, KPMG, big n considered, had certified the accounts. The financial damage suffered by SONARA 
due to the auditor KPMG and its Joint Statutory Auditors K and Co., would amount, according to independent 
monitors, three billion six hundred nine million three hundred and eighty seven thousand two hundred and 
nineteen (3 609 387 219) CFA Francs. As financial discipline, a fine was imposed at KPMG in these terms: "The 
Council has decided, within the limits of its powers as defined by organic laws, to impose a special fine of two 
million (2000 000) CFA francs to each of KPMG Cabinets and K & Cie Co-Auditors of that company, 
individually, for all management errors committed by them in the context of that case”. 
4.2 Breach of KPMG: A question of independence? 
KPMG's independence can it be questioned for the study period considered? Note that the head of the company 
for the period was considered guilty of serious management errors that led to a lawsuit against him and his 
conviction. This leaves clear that the accounts contained significant anomalies that the audit did not disclosed. 
By sticking to the definition of independence as an anomaly revelation exercise (De Angelo, 1981), we can 
assume that in the case of KPMG, there was indeed a problem of auditor independence. The multiannual 
character of the period reinforces this position. This implies that over three years the Co-auditors have failed to 
disclose certain anomalies that have visibly affected the management of the company. The issue of certification 
of accounts over three years, was it with reservations, while abnormalities in the management persist, an offense 
due to the independence of the contracted auditors 
4.3 Analysis and Implications 
To analyze the case in the study, part of the main perceived threats to independence of the auditor as presented 
by Lin and Téplagul (2009) will be used. The implications are thus freed to improve understanding. 
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4.3.1 The main threats to independence according to Lin Téplagul (2009) 
Lin and Téplagul (2009) reviewed publications related to auditor's independence. The article they published to 
this effect identifies four main threats to auditor’s independence. The first relates to the importance of the audit 
client may have in the auditor's portfolio. The risk of compromisinf independence being here with the fact that 
the auditor, given the significant financial weight occupied by a company in its client portfolio and therefore 
coating or less the survival of the organization, will be tempted to conceal any anomaly discovered during the 
audit, or at best mitigate it, protecting the life of the audited company and starting his. The financial dependence 
is inevitable, the auditor's remuneration getting from his client (De Angelo, 1981). When from that compensation 
depends the survival of the auditor or when so auspicious growing economic gains for him, there are great risks 
that it acts on behalf of the client (Blay, 2005). To work around this situation, the authors focused on the risk of 
litigation arising between the auditor and stakeholders and regulators after the mission. They argue, in fact, the 
idea that the high risk of litigation would decrease the likelihood that the auditor works in favor of the customer 
(Farmer, Rittenberg and Trompeter, 1987; Schatzberg and Sevcik, 1994). In case of audit failure in reality, the 
auditor may be subject to legal proceedings by investors, stakeholders or even the regulatory agencies or control 
of the profession, such as the Chartered accountants. If such events were to occur, the auditor's reputation would 
take a serious blow, and the he is likely to lose the remaining number of clients (De Angelo, 1981). Therefore the 
risk of litigation in a mission is an incentive for the auditor to remain independent despite economic dependence. 
The second independence threat identified is auditor tenure. It can be considered that a higher auditor's tenure 
translates certain "warmth" of its relationship with its client company. This posture is still with what Bazerman, 
Morgan and Loeweinstein (2003) call "Through personal interest", which reflects the inability of the auditor to 
be independent. According to them, he is closer to the managers he knows better with time, rather than 
anonymous users it does not know, so sometimes unconsciously, will not defend their interests. However, 
opinions are divided on this point. Shockley (1981) reports such as auditor’s tenure beyond five years are not 
perceived as significantly reducing the auditor's independence. Deis and Giroux (1992) think that audit quality is 
inversely proportional to audit tenure, and therefore the more it lasts, the more low quality 
The potential affiliation of clients with certified public accountants is also a risk of compromising auditor's 
independence. It is difficult for an auditor to keep his independence from former colleagues became executive 
officers of the auditee, or to remain independent in front of a company that offers him a job. The proximity with 
management can create a parallel distance with business owners who are the real employers of the auditor and 
the audit team would have difficulty maintaining its independence in dealing with former colleagues (Imhoff, 
1978). 
The impact of non audit services is as Lin and Téplagul (2009) said the most studied of perceived independence 
threats. The risk that the auditor's independence may be damaged when it advises his client at the same time is 
great. It thus contributes to audit the accounts for the establishment of which he has participated. Levine and 
Kornish (2004) believe that the higher the level of consulting, the more the relationship between the auditor and 
auditee becomes dangerously friendly. Dopuch and King (1991) indicate that restrict an auditor to provide both 
audit and advisory services does not lead to efficiency gains, but may cause auditors to choose advisory services 
rather than the audit. Similarly, Barkess and Simnett (1994) tested the relationship between consultancy and 
audit fees. The research has been done on a large sample of Australian audit firms from 1986 to 1990. Each year, 
between 371 and 466 of the 500 largest companies were drawn from the sample, for a total of approximately 
2094 observations. Using linear regression analysis, the authors rejected the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between the provision of non audit services and audit fees. Laws such as SOX in its section 201 
prohibit certain types of advice. Their impact on the independence is controversial, and a key aspect audit 
quality. 
4.3.2 What are the implications for the considered case? 
The difficult access to information in our context has forced the work to be limited to the level of analysis. 
Previously stated threats have been reconciled with the case under consideration. 
Financial dependence is the first threat of independence which may have had a decisive effect on the case. One 
of the criticisms leveled at large as a factor of independence is related to the probability of vulnerability of the 
local office of a large network (Pigé, 2003). So while KPMG is a giant of the audit, it is possible that its local 
representation could be in a situation where SONARA was an important and indispensable part of its turnover. 
The environment generally little contentious is a less instigator of independence (Farmer, Rittenberg and 
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Trompeter, 1987; Schatzberg and Sevcik, 1994), in that the reputation of the auditor is less likely to be tainted 
because of absence of litigation following an audit engagement. 
"Control" covering the period 2007-2010, three-year contract between the parties, without taking into account 
the fact that the signature of the contract could date from before the date of "rechecking". It is possible to 
postulate that KPMG already had a basic knowledge of the company and its operations. It could be noted an 
improvement in SONARA balance sheet in 2007, total assets increased from 32 446 million in 2007 to 59,023 
million in 2008, representing 54.97% growth. Over the same period, shareholders' equity will evolve to 69.59%. 
If we stick to the theoretical framework of perceived threats of Lin and Téplagul (2008), with the experience due 
to audit tenure, auditing tends to gain in quality (Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds, 2002; Maxwell and Miller, 
2004 ), and the good results of the company over the period of the study would show its welfare and the good 
quality of the statutory audit carried out. The non-disclosure of anomalies appears to be an additional obstacle to 
the independence of statutory auditors of the considered company. 
The threat of potential employment is less observable, even at the prior study on auditor independence (Francis, 
2004). Otherwise, non-audit services are a key element. For the study period under review, KPMG has been a 
trusted advisor to the company, at the policy control losses that includes quality management, management of 
human resources, or improved performance at the level of losses control. Advisory services are considered by 
the literature as a motivation for the auditor in front of abnormality in the accounts, to rule in favor of 
management, to protect the fees related to its non-audit services. Providing advice would therefore have been a 
motivation for not revealing the anomalies discovered and revealed in "rechecking" for KPMG. The thesis of the 
importance of the company for the local office of the American giant, seems to be favored here, given the 
turnover of SONARA in 2008 (787 768 million) and operating income (43 516 million CFA). 
5. Conclusion and Discussion 
Auditor's independence is now a key part of the accounts verification or external auditing in general. The 
motivations for opportunistic behavior of the auditor necessitate refinement together legal mechanisms of 
control, and also research in the field. Accounting literature has considered the international auditors (big n) as 
models to follow or imitate for auditor’s independence issues. Criticism from Pigé (2003), coupled with the 
historical failure of a large auditing firm Arthur Andersen underlined the necessity to further research on the 
issue. From the analysis of a case of "rechecking" accounts for a big client n Cameroon, assuming the risk of loss 
of independence for networked auditor when its client is an important part of its local revenue, or represents one 
of its major clients, this hypothesis seems to be supported. The analysis thus reveals, after the analysis from four 
perceived threats to independence studied, that it is possible that KPMG could jeopardize its independence to 
enjoy the benefits of its advisory position, or its audit tenure as auditors.  
The analysis, however, has some limitations: It is based on a comparative analysis with theoretical 
considerations borrowed to Lin and Téplagul (2009). So the facts have not had a strong impact on this work. It 
would be interesting for future research work, to analyze cases of failure audit of large accounts verifiers using 
the figures and compared data from the financial accounts of the stakeholders, in terms of the amount of the 
advisory services, or their proportion in the turnover of theauditor. Another avenue of future research would be 
to examine the issue through the study of two cases of big and not big n auditor exercising in the same 
environment, to understand the protections and guarantees of the auditor's independence and the way in which 
the actors mobilize these guarantees during an actual audit mission. 
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